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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

LEGISLATION
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IN THE PENNSYLVANIA
LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT OF 1951
Although it is designed primarily to blend the salmagundi of old statutes
and case law concerning the whole of the landlord-tenant relation, the new Landlord
and Tenant Act of 19511 demands the particular attention of counsel when a lease
is actually being drawn up.
The Statute of Frauds in the Act of 17722 is expressly repealed insofar as it
applies to leases and is replaced by § 202 of the new act, which provides:
"Real property, including any personal property thereon, may be
leased for a term ot more than three years by a landlord to a tenant or by
their respective agents lawfully authorized in writing. Any such lease must
be in writing and signed by the parties making or creating the same, otherwise it shall have the force and effect of a lease at will only... unless
the tenancy has continued for more than one year, and the landlord and
tenant have recognized its rightful existence by claiming and admitting liability for rent . . ."
Superficially, at least, the words of the Act of 1951 would seem to affirm
the Statute of Frauds provision contained in the Act of 1772, which, in an almost
like manner, provides:
"..... all leases, interests of freehold, or term of years or any . . .
uncertain interest of, in or out of any ... land ... created by livery of
seisin only, or by parol, and not put in writing, and signed by the parties
so making or creating the same, or their agents, thereunto lawfully
authorized in writing, shall have the force and effect of leases or estates
of will only...
The classic interpretation of this section of the Act of 1772 is that the lease
(or contract to sell, or conveyance) must be signed by the "party creating the intervst"-in other words, the vendor or lessor,8 and it has long been held that the lessee,
vendee, optionee, or assignee of any of the former need not sign to comply with
this section because such parties ". . . are not 'parties making or creating' the interest in the land, which arises from the agreement." 4
The long line of precedent which supports this interpretation of the old act
renders an inquiry into the soundness of its reasoning fruitless, no doubt, but nonetheless tempting, because the new act uses exactly the same phraseology as the
Act of 1772, although it appears that the legislative intent of the new act is that
both parties to the lease must sign it.
1 LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT OF 1951, Act No. 20, 68 P.S. §§ 250.101-250.602.
2 Act of March 21, 1772, 1 Sm.L. 389, § 1; 33 P.S. 1.
3 Lowry v. Mehaffey, 10 W. 387 (1840) ; Everhart v. Dolph, 133 Pa. 628, 19 A. 431 (1890) ; Axe
v. Potts, 349 Pa. 339 (1944).
4 Stevenson v. Titus, 332 Pa. 100, 2 A.2d 853 (1939).
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First of all, have the courts justification for holding that the Act of 1772
requires only that the party creating the interest sign the lease or other instrument?
Note the wording of both acts: " . . . signed by the parties so making or creating
the same.. ." It already has been pointed out that Pennsylvania case law universally
interpreted "parties," as set forth, to mean "party," and the expression "party
creating the interest" is common usage in the profession. Academically, the question
could be made to turn on the further question, How many parties does it take to
create an interest? Logically, it would seem that two parties are required, because
even a gift requires a donee as well as a donor.
Perhaps the reason is semantical. Notice that the word "interest" has been
signed by the
substituted by the courts for the word "same" in the phrase "....
probably
for
this
construction
.
."
The
reason
parties making or creating the same.
appears in the limbo of long forgotten cases, but its practical effect is obvious: "interest" implies the singular, thus reinforcing the adoption of "party" instead of
"parties" by the courts, although the word "same" actually refers to the word "intetests of freehold" with equid force. Since there are several types of estates set forth
in the Act of 1772, among them, leases, freehold interests, terms for years or "any
uncertain interest," it could be contended that the courts have based the substitution
of the word "party" for "parties" upon the principle that "parties" in the act refers
to the vendor in all four cases just mentioned.
But it is at this juncture that the context in which the phrase "signed by the
parties so making or creating the same," as it also appears in the new act, loses its
academic aspect and becomes extremely practical, because the Landlord and Tenant
Act of 1951, as its title implies, refers not to four different types of estates, but
only to leases. The new act requires that where real property is to be leased for more
than three years "Any such lease... by a landlord to a tenant.. .must be in writing and signed by the parties making or creating the same ... or by their agents
lawfully authorized in writing." 5 The phrase that requires the lease to be in writing
is in precisely the same language as the Act of 1772, but here the only antecedent of
the word "same" is "lease." Therefore, to what could the word "parties" refer in
a lease except the lessee and the lessor? In addition, the same section requires that
their agents be lawfully authorized in writing-surely it cannot be contended that
the agents of both the vendor and the vendee need -writtenauthorization, but that
only the agent of the vendor must sign!
Nevertheless, the new act will be subject to the vagaries of judicial construction,
as was its predecessor, and it may be interpreted to mean that only the vendor must
sign a lease intended to exceed a three year period. However, it is suggested that in
the future attorneys insist on a lease signed by both the vendor and the vendee, or
their agents under written authority, as a safeguard against the possibility that
the courts may construe the new act as it is written.
5

Emphasis supplied, and text of the act slightly rearranged.
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Another variation from the provisions of the Act of 1772 is presented by
§ 203 of the Act of 1951:

"No lease of any real property made or created for a term of more
than three years shall be assigned, granted or surrended except in writing signed by the party assigning, granting or surrendering the same or
his agent, unless such assigning, granting or surrendering shall result from
operation of law."
In this instance, the deviation from the old act is more explicit since, after
the word "agent," the new act omits the phrase ". . . thereto lawfully authorized in
writing . . ." Written authority, a requisite under the Act of 1772, was rigorously
construed by the courts, 6 and lack of it could not be overcome, even if the agent,
originally without written authority, received the rents or eventually became the
owner, 7 although written ratification 8 or performance 9 by the vendor would
validate the lease. Since the Act of 1951 dispenses completely with the requirement
it would stem that, in the future, courts will require the agent of the assignor to have
written authority only by ignoring the act completely. But this possibility cannot be
discounted entirely, and for the present, attorneys should see to it that the party
assigning, or his agent authorizing in writing, have signed such a transfer.
Frederic K. Spies
6 McDowell v. Simpson, 3 W. 129 (1834); Willis-Winchester Co. v. Clay, 293 Pa. 513, 520,
143 A. 227 (1928).
7 Mott v. Kaldes, 288 Pa. 264, 135 A. 764 (1927).
8 Holland Furnace Co. v. Keystone Dehydrating Co., 151 Pa. Super. 495, 30 A.2d 872 (1943).

9 Reinhold v. Laufer (No. 2), 6 North. 376 (1899).

